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According to economic logic, introducing and increasing school choice and competition
is probably the most efﬁcient and cost-effective education policy. The reasoning is simple
and intuitive, more school choice and competition make it easier for parents to ﬁnd a
school that ﬁts the speciﬁc needs of their children thereby enhancing allocative efﬁciency.
At the same time it limits schools’ market power thereby giving them an incentive to
achieve productive efﬁciency. To implement this, Friedman (1955) proposed a system in
which the government gives a speciﬁed amount of money for each child that parents can
spend at the school of their choice, publicly or privately operated, as long as the school
meets some minimum standards.
Despite this logic, few countries have implemented a system that is even remotely
close to Friedman’s proposed system. Moreover, the empirical evidence in support of
school choice and competition is not clear-cut and far less convincing than the theo-
retical argument. There are two main reasons for this. The ﬁrst is that many studies
assess the partial-equilibrium effects of rather speciﬁc interventions such as small-scale
voucher experiments, open enrollment or charter schools, that are often targeted at spe-
ciﬁc groups. The results of these studies cannot be generalized to system-wide school
choice and competition. The other reason is that it has turned out to be very difﬁcult to
come up with sources of truly exogenous supply-driven variation in school choice and
competition (Hoxby, 2009). This is particularly the case for studies that aim to identify
the general equilibrium effects of school choice and competition.1
In this paper, we study the effect of school choice and competition on pupils’ achieve-
ment in primary schools in the Netherlands. The primary school system in this country is
very close to the system proposed by Friedman, and has been in place in that form since
1917. Parents can freely choose the school for their child irrespective of where they live
and how much they earn, and all schools, publicly or privately operated, are funded by
the central government through a “money follows pupil”-mechanism. The minimum stan-
dards schools have to meet in order to receive government funding, relate to educational
quality which is monitored by the education inspectorate, and to the minimum number of
pupils that is enrolled in a school.
To identify the effect of school choice and competition on pupils’ achievement, we use
a supply side reform that consisted of a change in the rule that determines the minimum
number of pupils that has to be enrolled for a school to be eligible for funding. Before
1994 this rule was based on the number of inhabitants within a municipality whereas from
1994 onwards the rule relied on a municipality’s pupil density. For many municipalities
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Figure 1. Number of primary schools in the Netherlands 1990−2004
the minimum required school size increased and many schools with a number of pupils
above the old rule had a school size below the new rule. As a consequence the number of
primary schools declined by about 15 percent. This can be seen in Figure 1, which shows
the number of primary schools in the Netherlands by year for the period from 1990 to
2004. The decrease in the number of schools occurred between 1992 and 1996. This is
due to the fact that the policy was announced in 1992 and that schools had until 1996 to
comply with the new rule.
To investigate the effect of a reduction in the supply of schools on pupils’ test scores,
weexploitthatthechangesintheminimumrequiredschoolsizesandtheresultingchanges
in the number of schools varied across municipalities. In this paper we will use the num-
ber of schools in a municipality as measure of school choice and competition. A change
in the number of schools in a municipality changes the number of schools from which
parents can choose in their own municipality. A change in the number of schools in a
municipality also changes the number of competitors with which the (remaining) schools
in a municipality have to compete.2 We will focus on two cohorts of pupils; the last co-
hort of pupils who ﬁnished primary school before the policy was announced and the ﬁrst
cohort of pupils who enrolled in primary school when the policy was fully implemented.
2We prefer the number of schools in a municipality as measure of school choice and competition over
a measure such as the Herﬁndahl index because we consider it more intuitive. Moreover, the Herﬁndahl
index takes the size distribution of the schools into account. In the context of school choice it is not so
clear why for a given number of schools, a different size distribution affects parents’ choice set. Our results
are, however, not dependent on the choice and competition measure that we use. In the appendix we report
results based on the Herﬁndahl index instead of the number of schools.
2Using changes in the minimum required school size in a municipality as instrumental
variable for the change in the number of schools in a municipality, we ﬁnd that a 10
percent reduction in school choice and competition increases pupils’ achievement by 3
percent of a standard deviation. To understand this seemingly counterintuitive result, it
is important to realize that in a system with free choice, a reduction in the supply of
schools not only implies a reduction in school choice but, for a given number of pupils,
also implies an increase in average school size. In addition a reduction in the supply of
schools may have an effect on school segregation, since fewer schools implies that there
are fewer opportunities for pupils to sort among schools.
We present support for the hypothesis that in the setting in which the Dutch reform
took place, scale economies dominate the effects of choice and competition. Before the
reform, there were many schools that apparently operated at an inefﬁciently small scale.
We also present evidence showing that school segregation did not change. We do not
interpret our ﬁndings as evidence against the economic logic of school choice and com-
petition. Instead, we draw attention to a trade-off between the beneﬁts of choice and
competition on the one hand and scale economies on the other hand. Our results show
that at some point the latter may exceed the ﬁrst. Our results are an illustration of the
classical trade-off between market power and scale economies of anti-trust economics
(Williamson, 1968).
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. The next section discusses how our
contribution ﬁts into the existing literature on school choice and competition. Section
3 provides information about the Dutch education system thereby focusing on existing
mechanisms for parents to exercise choice and for schools to respond to that. Section 4
describes the details of the change in the minimum school size rule that we use as our
source of exogenous supply-driven variation in school choice and competition. Section
5 introduces the data and Section 6 provides details of our estimation strategy. Section 7
presents and discusses the results and Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
2 Related research
In this section we brieﬂy discuss how the research in this paper is related to different
strands of the school choice and competition literature.
A ﬁrst group of studies deals with choice programs such as voucher experiments,
charter schools and changes in the set of schools from which students can choose.3 These
3For vouchers programs, see: Rouse (1998); Angrist et al. (2002); Peterson et al. (2003); Krueger and
Zhu (2004); Angrist et al. (2006), for charter schools, see: Bettinger (2005); Hoxby and Rockoff (2005);
Bifulco and Ladd (2006); Hanushek et al. (2007); Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2009); Imberman (2010), and for
changes in the choice set, see: Cullen et al. (2006); Lavy (2010)
3studies typically examine the impact of the program on the achievement of the students
that make use of it. The impact on other students (the peers that are left behind and the
new peers) is usually ignored, and so are the effects through more competitive pressure
on schools (see Ladd, 2002; Neal, 2002, for a discussion). Compared to the partial equi-
librium effects that these studies estimate, our analysis looks at the average impact on all
pupils in a municipality where the degree of school choice and competition has changed.
Closer to our research are the studies that examine the general equilibrium effects of
system-wide variation in school choice and competition. The evidence from these stud-
ies is mixed. Hoxby (2000) looks at the impact of Tiebout choice in American public
education on various indicators of achievement by exploiting variation in the number of
school districts across metropolitan areas induced by variation in natural boundaries. She
reports signiﬁcantly positive effects of school choice and competition on achievement.
To measure the effects of unrestricted choice on educational outcomes in Chile, Hsieh
and Urquiola (2006) use the differential impact across municipalities that the provision of
vouchers had on private enrollment. They ﬁnd no evidence that choice improved average
educational outcomes. However, they do ﬁnd evidence that the program increased sort-
ing, as the best public school students left for the private sector. Böhlmark and Lindahl
(2008) use a similar approach to assess the impact of a voucher reform that was imple-
mented in Sweden in 1992. While they ﬁnd moderately positive short-term effects of an
increase in the private school share, they fail to ﬁnd any impact on medium or long-term
educational outcomes. Gibbons et al. (2008) use discontinuities generated by admissions
district boundaries to ﬁnd that performance gains from greater school competition among
English primary schools are limited. Finally, Card et al. (2010) use variation in the frac-
tions of Catholics and of new homes across local areas in Ontario to ﬁnd that competitive
pressure has a signiﬁcantly positive impact on test score gains.
Because of the transparency of our setup it is clear that we use a source of exogenous
variation in school choice and competition that is completely supply side driven. Previous
studies, for instance, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) and Böhlmark and Lindahl (2008) have
to assume that the variation in the entry of private schools across areas is supply driven
conditional on time trends and covariates (cf. Hoxby, 2009). Likewise, Card et al. (2010)
need to assume that, conditional on the joint share of Protestants and Catholics, the share
of Catholics has no direct impact on outcomes. Also the results in Hoxby (2000) are
not uncontested (cf. Rothstein, 2007; Hoxby, 2007). The starting point of our study also
differs from that of previous studies. While most existing studies start from a situation
with very limited choice, the starting point in this paper is a situation with a lot of choice
being in place already for a long time.
Since the reform that we exploit in this paper led to school mergers, our work is
4also related to studies that deal with consolidation of schools or school districts (Berry,
2006; Berry and West, 2008; Brasington, 1999, 2003). Andrews et al. (2002) review the
literature that is concerned with scale economies in education and conclude that "there
is little convincing evidence in the United States on how consolidation actually affects
school districts in the long-run." Kuziemko (2006) is interested in school size effects,
and notes the lack of consensus in the literature concerning the relation between scale
and achievement, and explains this by "the empirical weakness that the existing papers
share", namely omitted variables bias. These studies focus on scale effects and ignore
the effects of changes in competitive pressure. Our approach is different. We study the
effects of school choice and competition in a context where a change in the number of
schools necessarily also implies a change in average school size. We consider these two
changes as joint elements. Previous studies focusing on school choice and competition
have typically ignored scale effects, while previous studies focusing on consolidation or
scale effects have typically ignored the effects of school choice and competition.4
3 The Dutch education system
Since the beginning of the 20th century the Dutch system of primary education resembles
closely the voucher-system later proposed by Friedman. A key principle is “freedom of
education”. Thishastwocomponents: Parentscanfreelychoosetheschoolfortheirchild,
and there is the freedom to start new schools and to organize the teaching in schools.
The freedom to choose a school is not restricted by where parents live (there are no
school attendance areas) or how much they earn. With the exception of a few cases
of orthodox religious schools, primary schools do not select pupils. Schools can grow
or shrink from year to year, albeit within the limits of the speed with which they can
adjust their capacity. If schools are oversubscribed, they typically follow a ﬁrst-come,
ﬁrst-served rule. Applying this rule is facilitated by the system of rolling admissions.
Children in the Netherlands are allowed to start school the day they turn 4 years old, and
are required to start school the day they turn 5 years old. This system prevents that a large
group of children applies to a school at the same time and is then informed that the school
has no places available. Also, this system of rolling admissions provides more ﬂexibility
for schools to adjust their capacity.
There are public schools which provide education on behalf of the state, and private
schools which are not set up by the state. Both types of schools receive funding from the
central government through the same “money follows pupil”-mechanism. The funding of
a school is thus based on the number of pupils enrolled. There is no additional funding
4Relating their work to that in Hoxby (2000), Berry and West (2008) acknowledge that any size effect
they ﬁnd also includes the effect of changes in competition.
5from local government agencies and there are no compulsory school fees. Schools are
allowed to ask for a voluntary fee which is usually spent on extras, for example the yearly
school trip. Schools cannot exclude pupils whose parents do not pay this voluntary fee
fromtheregularschoolprogram. Theycan, however, excludethesepupilsfromtheextras.
Privately funded primary schools are virtually non-existent in the Netherlands.
Currently there are about 7000 primary schools in the Netherlands. For most pupils
in the Netherlands the nearest primary school is within walking distance. For about 59
percent of the pupils the nearest school is less than 500 meters from their home and 89
percent of the pupils live less than 1 kilometer away from the nearest primary school
(Bunschoten, 2008). About two thirds of pupils is enrolled in publicly-funded private
schools. The main difference between public schools and publicly-funded private schools
is that the latter are governed by a private school board and the ﬁrst are governed by the
municipality. Historically most private schools were founded on the basis of religious
beliefs (mainly Protestantism and Catholicism).
To be eligible for government funding, schools have to satisfy two requirements. The
ﬁrstcomesintheformofqualitystandards. Forexample, thegovernmentsetsanumberof
core objectives. These core objectives state what skills and knowledge pupils should have
at the end of (primary) school. Whether these core objectives are achieved is checked
by the educational inspectorate, which monitors schools for compliance with laws and
regulations.
The second requirement concerns the number of pupils at a school. To start a new
school the number of pupils enrolled in the school should within a speciﬁed period after
the start-up exceed a certain threshold (that applies for new schools). For existing schools
a different set of minimum school size rules applies, which are in general lower than
the rules for new schools. In order to be eligible for government funding an existing
school should have a number of pupils which is above the minimum school size rule.
The minimum required school sizes are set by the central government but vary between
municipalities. This will be described in more detail in the next section.
Primary education in the Netherlands covers eight grades; children enter primary
school between their fourth and ﬁfth birthday, and unless they repeat a grade, leave pri-
mary school at the age of 11 or 12. At the end of primary school children make a national
exit test which assesses their level in arithmetic, language and information processing.
Pupils’ performance on this test is used to track them into secondary schools. We use the
test results as our outcome variable in the analyses.
64 The reform
Primary schools in the Netherlands must comply with the minimum school size rule in
order to be eligible for funding. This rule stipulates the minimum number of pupils that
should be enrolled in a school. In the 1980’s there were concerns about the size of the
schools. There were many small schools and there were doubts about the ability of small
schools to provide education of sufﬁcient quality (Ministry of Education, 1990). In ad-
dition, the funding system was such that each school received a ﬁxed amount plus an
amount depending on the number of pupils. Many small schools were thus more expen-
sive than a smaller number of bigger schools. For these reasons a project was started in
the beginning of the 1990’s, which resulted in an overall change in the minimum school
size rule which was established in a law that took effect on January 1, 1994.
Before 1994 the funding of a school was ended on August 1 when during the previous
three school years the school had fewer pupils than the number required under the Pri-
mary Education Act (Staatsblad 1986, 256, WBO).5 The required numbers of the Primary
Education Act were based on the number of inhabitants of the municipality in which the
school was located. The minimum school size depended on the number of inhabitants
according to the following step function:
minimum school size =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
50 if #inhabitants < 25;000
75 if 25;000  #inhabitants < 50;000
100 if 50,000#inhabitants < 100;000
125 if #inhabitants  100;000
So for example, if a school was located in a municipality with 30;000 inhabitants and had
less than 75 pupils for three consecutive years, the funding was stopped at the beginning
of the next school year in case of a privately-run school or was closed down in case of a
publicly-run school.6
On July 11, 1992 the new minimum school size rule was published in the weekly
magazine that is sent to all schools. Although the new rule was published in 1992, the
old rule applied until January 1, 1994. The new minimum school size rule was no longer
based on the number of inhabitants of the municipality, instead the new rule was based on
5A school year starts on August 1 of a given year and ends on July 31 the following year.
6If a privately-run school stops receiving funding from the government this means in practice that it has
to close down. The only source of funding is the funding of the government since schools are not allowed
to charge school fees.
7the pupil density of the municipality according to the following formula:
minimum school size =
dm
0:25+0:0045dm
whereby dm is pupil density in municipality m deﬁned as the number of inhabitants be-
tween 4 and 11 years old divided by the size of the municipality in square kilometers.
Figure 2 shows scatter plots of the old and new minimum school size rules. The ﬁrst
panel shows a scatter plot of the old and new rules against the number of inhabitants.
The circles connected by the line show the old minimum school size rule, each circle
represents a municipality. All municipalities with less than 25,000 inhabitants have a
minimum school size of 50, at 25,000 there is a jump to 75, at 50,000 there is a jump to
100 and all municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants have a minimum school
size of 125. The crosses show the new minimum school size rule, the new minimum
school size ranges from 23 pupils to 200 pupils. As can be seen in the ﬁrst panel there is
a lot of variation in the new minimum school size between municipalities with the same
number of inhabitants, and thus the same minimum school size before the reform.
The second panel in Figure 2 shows the old and new rules by pupil density. The
new minimum school size rule, shown by the crosses, shows a clear relation with pupil
density.7 Municipalities with the same pupil density have the same minimum school size
after the reform but as the dots show, the old minimum school size could be very different
for municipalities with the same pupil density.
The new rule was introduced in 1994 but there was a grace period of two years.
No schools were forced to close down or stopped receiving funding in the school years
1994/1995 and 1995/1996. If a school had a number of pupils below the rule in the
school years 1994/1995 and 1995/1996 the school stopped receiving funding from Au-
gust 1, 1996 in case of a private school or was closed down in case of a public school.
From 1996 onward all schools with a number of pupils below the minimum school size
for two school years (either consecutive or with one year in between) were closed down/
stopped receiving funding from the beginning of the next school year.
On average the minimum school size increased due to the reform. Figure 3 shows
the average minimum school size by year as well as the average number of schools in a
municipality by year. The vertical axis on the left shows the average number of schools
and the vertical axis on the right shows the average minimum school size. Until 1993 the
average minimum school size was just above 60 pupils. In 1994, after the implementation
of the law, the average minimum school size jumped to about 100. At the same time the
average number of schools declined. In 1991 municipalities had on average 16.5 schools,
7There are some "outliers" which are due to the fact that if the pupil density was more that 500 it was


































1 2 5 10 25 50 100 200 400 800






































































































1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Year
Figure 3. Average number of schools and minimum school size rules by year
but after 1992 thenumber of schools started declining until 1997when it stabilized around
an average of 13.5 schools per municipality. In total the number of schools declined from
8362 schools in 1992 to 7100 schools in 1997, a decline of 15 % within a period of ﬁve
years.8
Most schools that were below the new rule in 1994, merged with another school in-
stead of being closed down on August 1, 1996. Of the 8362 primary schools in 1992,
2293 schools were part of a merger in the ﬁve years between 1992 and 1997. Most of
these mergers were real mergers and not administrative mergers as is reﬂected by the fact
that the number of school locations declined to 7163 in 2003.9
5 Data
We use data from various sources. As outcome variable we use standardized test scores.
At the end of primary school pupils take a nationwide test developed by the national
institute for educational testing and measurement. This test determines for a large part
8The reform affected private and public schools similarly. We do not have access to schools’ denomi-
nation in our micro data, but from aggregate statistics we know that the share of public schools remained
approximately constant between 1992 and 1997, 35% vs. 33.5%.
9There were not only changes in the minimum school size rules for existing schools, but the minimum
school size rules for new schools also changed due to the reform. Before the reform the minimum school
size for new schools was 8
5 times the minimum school size for existing schools. After the reform the
minimum school size for new schools is 10
6 times the minimum school size for existing schools with a
minimum of 200. In principle this gives us a second instrumental variable. In practice, however, the two
instruments are too highly correlated for the second instrument to give any leverage.
10the type of secondary school a pupil will go to after primary school. Although the test is
not compulsory for pupils, most pupils take the test. The test consists of multiple choice
questions that deal with language, arithmetic/mathematics, information processing and
environmental studies (optional). The test is administered on three days in February and
at the end of the last day the answer sheets are sent to the testing institute, where they
are marked. The results for each pupil are sent back to the school. The score is based
on the number of correct answers for language, arithmetic/mathematics and information
processing. For the analysis in this paper we standardized the scores by year, so that
results can be interpreted in terms of standard deviation units of the annual test score
distribution.
Data at the school level for all primary schools in the Netherlands, such as information
about school size and the share of minority pupils, are obtained from the Dutch Ministry
of Education. Data at the municipality level are obtained from Statistics Netherlands. The
minimum school size rules are collected from Het Staatblad (1986, 1993) that publishes
(changes in) laws and from Gele Katern, a magazine for schools.
During our observation period some municipalities merged. Because a municipality
merger can lead to changes in pupil density it will trigger changes in the minimum re-
quired school size. A merger between municipalities however also leads to other changes
related to local governance. The analysis in this paper will therefore be based on the
municipalities that were not part of a merger between 1992 and 2004.10 About 20% of
the municipalities in 2004 are a result of a merger, the analysis will thus be based on the
remaining 80% of the municipalities.
Intheanalysiswewillcomparetwocohortsofpupils; thecohortofpupilsthatﬁnished
primary school in 1992, before the change in the number of schools, and the cohort of
pupils that enrolled in primary school after the large reduction in the number of schools
and who were therefore not directly affected by the school mergers. This is the cohort of
pupils who ﬁnished primary school in 2003.
Table 1 shows summary statistics separately for the years 1992 and 2003. The bottom
panel of the table shows the substantial changes that took place in the average number
of schools and the average minimum school sizes. We also see that the numbers of in-
habitants and pupils increased increased by 7 to 10 percent. The top part of the table
shows that the number of pupils that took the test increased much more than the number
of pupils. This is not problematic for the analysis as long as the change in test-taking
pupils is unrelated to the changes in the minimum school sizes rules. The results in Table
A in the Appendix show that the change in the share of test-takers (ratio of test-takers to
number of 11-year-olds in municipality) is not signiﬁcantly related to the change in the
10We take 2004 as end date because the school year 2003 starts in August 2003 but ends in June 2004
11Table 1. Summary statistics
1992 2003
mean SD mean SD
Test scores
Standardized score -0.02 1.01 -0.02 1.01
N 71 283 111 226
Municipality Characteristics
Number of schools 17.31 21.09 14.35 18.18
Minimum school size (existing schools) 62.25 21.06 101.07 47.57
Number of pupils (1000) 2.97 4.72 3.24 5.20
Number of inhabitants (1000) 31.89 59.92 34.22 62.47
Share minority pupils 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
N 345 345
minimum school size rule.
6 Empirical approach
Before we present the empirical results, we ﬁrst spell out which empirical speciﬁcations
we will estimate and on which identifying assumptions these are based.
We are interested in the effect (d) of the number of schools in municipality m in year
t (smt) on the test scores of pupil i in that municipality in that year (yimt). We postulate the
following relationship:
yimt = a +d ln(smt)+lm+mt +eimt (1)
whereby lm is a vector of municipality ﬁxed effects, mt are year ﬁxed effects, eimt is an
idiosyncratic error term which we allow to be clustered at the municipality level.
Since the effect of a change in the number of schools by 1 is likely to be very different
in a municipality with 4 schools than in a municipality with 40 schools we do not include
the number of schools as explanatory variable but instead we use the logarithm of the
number of schools. In this case we can interpret d as the effect of a 100% change in the
number of schools on pupil test scores.
Equation (1) includes municipality ﬁxed effects. This is already an improvement over
a cross-sectional regression of test scores on the number of schools in a municipality.
This latter approach will produce biased estimates if municipalities with more or fewer
12schools are systematically different. The ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation takes out such system-
atic differences and only exploits within municipality changes in the number of schools.
In addition we include year ﬁxed effects which control for changes over time which are
the same across municipalities, such as education policies which are implemented nation-
wide.
Changes in the number of schools within a municipality may however be due to
changes in unobserved municipality characteristics. For example, a change in the com-
position of the population of the municipality might change the demand for schools, and
in addition have a direct impact on pupil test scores, leading to omitted variable bias. We
will therefore use an instrumental variable approach whereby we instrument the change in
the number of schools in a municipality between 1992 and 2003 by the immediate change
in the minimum required school size due to the change in rules.
Since the old and new minimum required school sizes are calculated based on the
number of inhabitants and pupil density in 1992, our instrument will not pick up changes
in the number of inhabitants or pupil density over time. The variation in our instru-
ment comes from differences between municipalities in the ratio of pupil density and the
number of inhabitants in 1992. If these municipalities also differ in other (unobserved)
characteristics this will be captured by the municipality ﬁxed effects. Our identifying as-
sumption is thus that the change in a municipality’s minimum required school size and
the change in the average residual achievement of pupils in that municipality are mean
independent.11
Although there are no speciﬁc reasons to believe that trends in test scores between
municipalities with different ratios of pupil density and the number of inhabitants would
be systematically different in absence of a change in the minimum school size rule, the
assumption would be weaker if we could condition on municipality-speciﬁc time trends.
This is not feasible because we only have observations from two years. To relax the
assumption of a common trend for all municipalities in the form of mt, we allow the year
ﬁxed effect to vary across four groups of municipalities of different size.12 13
In the next section we will start with presenting the difference-in-difference results
11Whereby the change in minimum school size and the change in average residual pupil achievement are
measured as deviations from a nation wide trend, since we include year ﬁxed effects in our speciﬁcation.
12Municipalities are divided into 4 categories based on the number of inhabitants: (0-25000), (25000-
50000), (50000- 100000) and (100000 or more). Trends in test scores are allowed to differ between these
four categories.
13A scenario under which the exclusion restriction might fail is if closeness to the minimum required
school size gives an incentive to schools to perform and if, in addition, the share of schools in a municipality
that are close to the norm is correlated with the instrument. As a robustness check we include the share of
schools in a municipality that are at most 25 pupils (about 10 percent of average school size) away from the
norm in equation (1). The coefﬁcient for this variable is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Moreover, the
estimated coefﬁcient of ln(number of schools) remains the same.
13Table 2. Difference in differences results
(1) (2) (3)
ln(number of schools) -0.05 -0.08 -0.03
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Control variables - Yes Yes
Allowing for different trends large - - Yes
and small municipalities
Nr municipalities 345 345 345
Nr observations 182509 182509 182509
Note: Dependent variable is standardized test score. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
municipality level. Control variables: ln(nr. pupils), ln(nr. inhabitants) and municipality share of ethnic
minority pupils. Trend in test scores between 1992 and 2003 are allowed to differ between municipalities
with number of inhabitants of respectively (0-25000), (25000-50000), (50000-100000) and (100000 or
more).
without using the change in minimum required school size as instrument for the change
in the number of schools. We will show results with and without control variables. Subse-
quently we will present our instrumental variables results. Since one may wonder whether
pupilsandschoolsinthesouthernpartofalargecityareaffectedbythenumberofschools
in the northern part of the city, we will also present estimates whereby we exclude the 20
biggest municipalities, those with more than 100,000 inhabitants (in 2003).
7 Results
7.1 Difference-in-differences estimates
We start with presenting ﬁxed-effect results which can be interpreted as naive difference-
in-differences estimates which ignore the possible endogeneity of the change in the num-
ber of schools in a municipality. Column 1 of Table 2 shows a regression of pupil test
scores on the number of schools in the municipality including municipality and year ﬁxed
effects, thereby controlling for (unobserved) differences between municipalities that are
constant over time and for changes over time that are constant across municipalities.14
The result in column 1 indicates that a 10% reduction in the number of schools is associ-
ated with an increase in test scores of about 0.5% of a standard deviation, which is very
small and not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
If changes in the number of schools are correlated to changes in other municipality
14See Appendix Table B1 for results using the Herﬁndahl index as measure of school choice and compe-
tition.
14characteristics affecting pupil test scores, this will lead to omitted variables bias. Column
2 therefore shows the results when changes in the number of inhabitants, changes in the
number of pupils and changes in the share of minority pupils in the municipality are
included as control variables. The coefﬁcient in column 2 is negative and a bit larger in
absolute value than the coefﬁcient in column 1 but also not signiﬁcantly different from
zero. Column 3 shows results where trends in test scores between 1992 and 2003 are
allowed to differ between municipalities with a different number of inhabitants. The
coefﬁcient in column 3 is a bit smaller in absolute value compared to the estimates in
columns 1 and 2 but still negative, small and not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
7.2 Instrumental variable estimates
Since the results in Table 2 might suffer from endogeneity problems we want to isolate
the change in the number of schools which is due to the reform, by using the change in
minimum school size rules as instrument. In order to avoid weak instrument problems
the effect of the change in rules on the change in schools should be sufﬁciently strong.
Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of the percentage change in the number of schools against
the percentage change in the minimum school size rule. On average the reduction in the
number of schools was 15% but, as Figure 4 shows, there was quite some variation in
the change in the number of schools. Some municipalities had no change in number of
schools while other municipalities faced a reduction in the number of schools of 50%.
Figure 4 also shows a linear ﬁt of the change in the number of schools schools on the
change in rules. There is a strong negative relation. This is conﬁrmed in column 1 of the
top panel of Table 3, which shows the result of a regression of the logarithm of the number
of schools on the logarithm of the minimum school size rule including municipality and
year ﬁxed effects and controlling for changes in a number of municipality characteristics.
The results in column 1 show that a 100% increase in the minimum school size rule leads
on average to a reduction in the number of schools of 19% which is signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level and has a partial F-statistic of 86.1.
The second stage results in the ﬁrst column of Table 3 use minimum school size as
instrument for the number of schools. Compared to the results in Table 2 the coefﬁcient
estimate in column 1 of Table 3 is larger in absolute value and signiﬁcantly different from
zero at a 5 percent signiﬁcance level. The results show that a 10% reduction in the number
of schools increases test scores on average by 3% of a standard deviation.15
The second columns in Tables 3 show the ﬁrst stage and second stage results when the
20 biggest municipalities (those with more than 100 000 inhabitants) are excluded from
15Equivalent ﬁrst stage and 2SLS results based on the Herﬁndahl index instead of the number of schools
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Figure 4. Change in rules and schools
Table 3. Main results: ﬁrst and second stage
(1) (2)
First-stage:
ln(minimum school size)  0:19***  0:18***
(0:02) (0:02)
Partial F-statistic 86:1 94:3
Second-stage:
ln(number of schools)  0:28**  0:26*
(0:13) (0:14)
Excluding biggest 20 municipalities - Yes
Nr municipalities 345 325
Nr observations 182,509 130,097
Note: Dependent variable in second stage is standardized test scores. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. * signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. All regression include municipality ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effect, control variables: ln(nr. pupils),
ln(nr. inhabitants), municipality share of ethnic minority pupils and trends are allowed to differ between
municipalities with number of inhabitants of respectively (0-25000), (25000- 50000), (50000- 100000) and
(100000 or more).
16the analysis. This does not affect our ﬁndings.
The results in Table 3 show that a reduction in choice due to a reduction in the sup-
ply of schools has a small positive impact on pupil performance. This is not what we
expect on the basis of the theoretical arguments for school choice and competition: With
more school choice it should be easier for parents to ﬁnd the school that matches their
preferences and the needs of their child. In addition more schools should lead to more
competition and a resulting increase in school quality. On the basis of these two mech-
anisms we would expect that a decrease in the supply of schools would have a negative
impact on pupil performance.
In the next two subsections, we examine two potential explanations for our ﬁndings.
The ﬁrst is often discussed in the school choice literature: More school choice could lead
to more sorting with potential adverse effects on school performance of (some) pupils.
The second potential explanation concerns economies of scale in education, something
which is rather underexplored in the literature on school choice. More school choice in
the form of more schools will for a given number of pupils always imply smaller schools
and if there are economies of scale this might adversely affect pupil performance.
7.3 Segregation
We ﬁrst investigate whether the decline in the supply of schools, due to the reform, af-
fected sorting of pupils among schools. For each primary school we know not only the
number of pupils attending the school but also the number of pupils in each of the fol-
lowing three categories; 1) pupils with low educated migrant parents, 2) pupils with low
educated Dutch parents and 3) all pupils that do not fall in the ﬁrst two categories. Given
this division of pupils by socioeconomic status we can calculate a relative heterogeneity
index as in Urquiola (2005). Urquiola investigates the effect of school choice on sorting
by investigating the impact of the number of school districts on the (racial/educational)
heterogeneity of a school district relative to the heterogeneity of the metropolitan area in




where R is the number of groups and Sr is the share of group r in the population.
On the basis of the division into the groups deﬁned above we can calculate the het-
erogeneity index for each school and for the municipality in which the school is located.
By taking the ratio of the two we obtain a measure of relative heterogeneity. There is
one issue though which is that the deﬁnition of the second category (pupils with low ed-
ucated Dutch parents) changed between 1992 and 2003. In 1992 all children with at least
one parent that had at most the lowest level of secondary education were included in this
category. In 2003 pupils were only included in the second category when both parents
had at most the lowest level of secondary education. Since this change in the deﬁnition
17Table 4. Effect of the number of schools on sorting
# Groups in Heterogeneity Index
3 2
Summary statistics Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Heterogeneity index school 0.36 0.20 0.12 0.15
Heterogeneity index municipality 0.44 0.14 0.17 0.14
Relative heterogeneity index 0.84 0.57 0.86 1.23
Results
ln(number of schools) -0.08 0.14
(0.09) (0.15)
Partial F-statistic ﬁrst stage 105.02 104.64
Nr. observations (schools) 11 403 11 391
Note: Dependent variable is school heterogeneity (relative to municipality heterogeneity). Estimates come
from 2SLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. All regression
include municipality ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effect, control variables: ln(nr. pupils), ln(nr. inhabitants), and
trends are allowed to differ between municipalities with number of inhabitants of respectively (0-25000),
(25000- 50000), (50000- 100000) and (100000 or more).
of the second category applied for all schools in all municipalities in the Netherlands this
should be captured by the year ﬁxed effect and therefore not affect the results. As an
additional robustness check we calculate the (relative) heterogeneity index on the basis
of two groups; 1) pupils with low educated migrant parents and 2) all other pupils. The
index based on this division is not affected by the change in the deﬁnition of the second
category.
Table 4 shows 2SLS results of the effect of the number of schools on the two measures
of relative heterogeneity, using the minimum school size rule as instrument. The result
shows that there is no signiﬁcant impact of the change in the supply of schools on sorting
of pupils in terms of socioeconomic status. The estimates are small and not signiﬁcantly
different from zero. This indicates that sorting cannot explain our ﬁndings.
7.4 Economies of scale
The change in the supply of schools affected school size. This can be seen from the kernel
densities of school size for the years 1992 and 2003 in Figure 5. Average school size
increased from 169 pupils in 1992 to about 221 pupils per school in 2003. The increase
in average school size can explain our ﬁndings if there are economies of scale. In this
subsection we provide two pieces of evidence for this to be the case. First, we present
results from a survey among school principals suggesting that increases in school size are
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Figure 5. Kernel density of school size in 1992 and 2003
beneﬁcial for some processes relevant for pupils’ performance. Second, we extend our
previous 2SLS regressions by including school size, and ﬁnd that the effect of the number
of schools in a municipality is no longer signiﬁcantly different from zero.
In the year of the announcement of the change in the minimum school size rule (1992),
a survey was conducted which asked principals of 177 primary schools in the Nether-
lands, among other things, about the organization of teaching in their schools and about
the schools’ contacts with parents.16 In Table 5, we report results from regressions of
these organizational features and school-parent contacts on the size of the school. Each
row comes from a different regression. The results show that larger school size is associ-
ated with (i) less teaching by the principal, (ii) a higher probability of having at least one
full time director, (iii) fewer classes with pupils from multiple grades, and (iv) a higher
probability of having a remedial teacher. At the same time a larger school is not asso-
ciated with less involvement of the parents with the school (as indicated in the second
half of the table). These ﬁndings are consistent with the view that just before the reform
was implemented, increases in school size would increase the efﬁciency of the teaching
process while it would not harm parental involvement.
To disentangle the effect of the change in school choice and competition and the effect
of the change in school size, we augment equation (1) with school size:
yimt = a +d ln(smt)+y ln(schoolsizeimt)+lm+mt +eimt (2)
16This survey is part of a larger project that collected data from primary school pupils, their parents and
teachers; the Landelijke Evaluatie Onderwijsvoorrangsbeleid. We only use information from the represen-
tative sample of schools.
19Table 5. Associations between school size and school characteristics
Dependent variable: ln(school size)
Share of time the principal spends on teaching. -0.139***
(0.023)
Probability the school has at least one full time director. 0.233***
(0.044)
Share of classes that contain pupils from multiple grades. -0.575***
(0.045)
Probability school has a remedial teacher. 0.181**
(0.052)
Probability school is involved in extracurricular parent-pupil activities -0.020
(0.053)
Probability school has agreement with parents about:
parents attending parent-teacher meetings . -0.002
(0.062)
discussing the school report of the pupils. 0.002
(0.023)
time spend on the different subjects. 0.087
(0.061)
minimum goals that pupils should achieve -0.035
(0.066)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Results are based a survey among principals of 177 schools in 1992.
20where y is the scale effect.
We estimate this speciﬁcation with OLS, but a concern is the potential endogeneity
of school size. Schools can be large because they are good and popular. In addition to
our OLS estimates we therefore also instrument school size. We will use variation in the
number of pupils at the municipality level as instrument for school size. The advantage
of this instrument is that it varies across municipalities while we expect the major source
of endogeneity to come from sorting across schools within a municipality. We continue
to control for (the log of) the number of inhabitants. For our instrument to be valid we
require shocks to the population share of pupils over time not to have an independent
effect on achievement.17
The ﬁrst column in Table 6 reports the estimates of the baseline speciﬁcation but
excludes the number of pupils from the list of covariates which was included to gain
precision in the speciﬁcations in Table 3. It is reassuring to see that this does not affect
the results. It also conﬁrms the exogeneity of our main instrument for the number of
schools. Column 2 then shows the results when the logarithm of school size is included in
the speciﬁcation. The coefﬁcient on the logarithm of the number of schools is reduced by
half of its original value and is no longer signiﬁcantly different from zero. The coefﬁcient
on the school size variable on the other hand indicates that test scores increase with school
size.
The ﬁnal column reports the estimates where (ln) school size is instrumented with the
(ln) number of pupils in the municipality. Since the speciﬁcation includes municipality
ﬁxed effects, changes in school size are essentially instrumented with changes in the pop-
ulation share of pupils. As can be seen in the table, we have good ﬁrst-stages for both our
endogenous variables. The estimated size effect is very close to the one we found using
OLS, and is close to being signiﬁcant at the 10%-level. A Hausman test does not reject
the null hypothesis that school size is exogenous in (2).18 In the ﬁnal column, the coefﬁ-
cient on the logarithm of the number of schools is further reduced (in absolute size) and
stays insigniﬁcant. These results are consistent with the reasoning that the negative effect
of the reduction in the supply of schools is explained by positive effects of an increase in
school size.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of variation in the number of schools in a
municipality on pupils’ achievement. Variation in the number of schools in a municipality
17We control for changes in the composition of the pupil population by including changes in the share of
minority pupils in a municipality over time as control variable.
18c2(1)=0.053 and the p-value of the test is equal to 0.8187.
21Table 6. Scale versus competition effects
(1) (2) (3)




Instrument ln(number of schools) yes yes yes
Instrument ln(schoolsize) n/a no yes
F statistic 1st stages:
ln(number of schools) 86.8 86.4 52.2
ln(schoolsize) 47.2
Nr municipalities 345 345 345
Nr observations 182509 182509 182509
Note: Dependent variable is standardized test scores. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
municipality level. ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Control variables: ln(nr.
inhabitants) and municipality share of ethnic minority pupils. Trend in test scores between 1992 and 2003
are allowed to differ between municipalities with number of inhabitants of respectively (0-25000), (25000-
50000), (50000- 100000) and (100000 or more).
22causes variation in school choice and competition. The setting of our analysis is primary
education in the Netherlands. This setting is very different from the settings of previous
papers that looked at the impact of school choice on achievement. While in most countries
school choice is limited, primary education in the Netherlands is characterized by a large
amount of choice. Parents can freely choose the school of their children and all primary
schools are publicly funded through a system in which money follows pupils.
We exploit variation in the number of schools at the level of municipalities induced by
a change in the minimum school size rule. Before the change the minimum school size in
a municipality was determined by the population size, after the change it was determined
by pupil density. Some municipalities were more affected by this change than others. We
ﬁnd a strong effect of the change in the minimum school size on the number of schools in
a municipality.
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative effect of the number of schools in a municipality on
pupils’ achievement. A reduction in the number of schools of 10 percent increases test
scores on average by 3 percent of a standard deviation. Hence, more school choice (and
competition) is – in the setting of primary education in the Netherlands – detrimental for
achievement. Our preferred explanation for this counter-intuitive result comes from the
fact that a reduction of the number of schools in a municipality mechanically implies an
increase in average school size. The reform reduced the number of small primary schools
in the Netherlands. If we include school size in the achievement equation, the negative
effect on the number of schools is smaller and no longer statistically signiﬁcant, and we
ﬁnd nearly identical estimates in an instrumental variable estimation. Information from a
survey among principals conducted just prior to the reform is consistent with this: larger
schools are associated with more efﬁcient teaching practices while parental involvement
does not vary signiﬁcantly with school size.
Our results call attention to a trade-off that is usually ignored in the school choice
and competition literature. If more choice and competition is induced by an increase
in the number of suppliers, and if the size of the market is ﬁxed, each supplier will on
average serve fewer pupils. Our results show that “scale effects can offset the beneﬁts
of competition”. The case that we examined in this paper bears some resemblance with
the discussion in introductory economics textbooks about the distinction between perfect
competition and monopolistic competition. Under monopolistic competition ﬁrms oper-
ate at a point of their average cost curve tangent to their demand curve. At this point
the ﬁrm’s supply is lower than the amount at which average costs are minimized. The
below minimum average costs are usually interpreted as the price customers have to pay
for increased product variety. In our setting, pupils paid in the form of lower achievement
to attend a smaller school, on average located closer to where they live.
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26Appendix A: The effect of minimum school size on the share test-
takers in a municipality
Table A: Change in minimum school size rule and the change in share test-takers
(1) (2) (3)
ln(minimum school size rule) 0.006 0.008 0.008
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Control variables - Yes Yes
Allowing for different trends large - - Yes
and small municipalities
Nr municipalities 345 345 345
Nr observations 690 690 690
Note: Dependent variable: ratio of test participants and the number of 11 year-olds in municipality. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Control variables: ln(nr. pupils), ln(nr.
inhabitants) and municipality share of ethnic minority pupils.Trend in test scores between 1992 and 2003
are allowed to differ between municipalities with number of inhabitants of respectively (0-25000), (25000-
50000), (50000- 100000) and (100000 or more).
Appendix B: Results based on the Herﬁndahl index
Table B1: Difference in differences results
(1) (2) (3)
Herﬁndahl index 0.485 0.504* 0.217
(0.341) (0.294) (0.259)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Control variables - Yes Yes
Allowing for different trends large - - Yes
and small municipalities
Nr municipalities 345 345 345
Nr observations 182509 182509 182509
Note: Dependent variable is standardized test scores. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
municipality level. * signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Control variables: ln(nr. pupils), ln(nr. inhabitants)
and municipality share of ethnic minority pupils. Trend in test scores between 1992 and 2003 are allowed
to differ between municipalities with number of inhabitants of respectively (0-25000), (25000- 50000),
(50000- 100000) and (100000 or more).
27Table B2: First stage and 2SLS results
(1) (2)
First stage
ln(minimum school size) -0.017*** -0.019***
(0.003) (0.003)
Partial F-statistic 38.7 35.1
Second stage
Herﬁndahl index -3.152** -2.565*
(1.552) (1.345)
Excluding biggest 20 municipalities - Yes
Nr municipalities 345 325
Nr observations 182509 130097
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *** signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. All regression include municipality ﬁxed effects, year ﬁxed effect, control variables: ln(nr.
pupils), ln(nr. inhabitants), municipality share of ethnic minority pupils and trends are allowed to differ
between municipalities with number of inhabitants of respectively (0-25000), (25000- 50000), (50000-
100000) and (100000 or more).
28Table B3: Scale versus competition effects
(1) (2) (3)




Instrument ln(# schools) yes yes yes
Instrument ln(schoolsize) n/a no yes
F statistic 1st stages:
Herﬁndahl index 38.2 36.0 19.33
ln(schoolsize) 47.23
Nr municipalities 345 345 345
Nr observations 182509 182509 182509
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level,
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Control variables: ln(nr. inhabitants) and municipality share of ethnic
minority pupils. Trend in test scores between 1992 and 2003 are allowed to differ between municipalities
with number of inhabitants of respectively (0-25000), (25000- 50000), (50000- 100000) and (100000 or
more).
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